Understanding the Human Cost of Insurgency and Terrorism

Nigeria is perhaps one of the most stark juxtapositions on the continent, a country with abundant mineral wealth and natural resources, but also with rampant domestic terrorism that has killed thousands. While it was sixth on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index with 565 deaths due to terrorism in 2024, a 34 per cent increase from 2023, the security crisis in Nigeria is much more than just numbers. Communities in multiple states have been devastated by the violence, with Amnesty International noting in Benue State alone at least 6,896 deaths between 2024 and May 2025 and a total of 10,217 across seven states since the current administration assumed office. More than the direct death toll, these figures indicate the systematic decimation of Nigerian society, orphaned children and families displaced from their homes and societies living in the shadow of endless terror.

While religion or ethnic farmer/herder conflict is the generally accepted discourse on Nigeria's terrorism crisis, it is a narrative that misses an infinitely more complex and dark reality. A complex economic struggle over Nigeria's untapped mineral resources, an estimated $700 billion, provides the backdrop to the sectarian violence. Whether it is the tin deposits in Plateau State, or the limestone quarries in Benue, or Zamfara's Gold mines, or the smattering of rare earth minerals across the middle belt, there is a clearly defined pattern that emerges areas with the most abundant natural resources tend to experience the most sustained and violent unrest. This isn't incidental but rather what security analysts have come to call resource terrorism, the intentional use of violence by both state and non-state actors to manipulate, extract and profit from the mineral wealth of Nigeria, often dislocating indigenous peoples who may resist or compete for these resources.

The Nigerian state's response to this crisis exposes institutional failures that are almost complicit, and in some cases, reports suggest that parts of the state may be engaged in a willful continuance of violence to retain access to profitable mining business. Military responses tend to be reactive rather than preventative, intelligence collection is still highly insufficient despite patterns of predictability in the attacks, and under 5% of attacks have been prosecuted. This becomes a vicious cycle in which violence leads to displacement, displacement to resource extraction, and extraction to profits, which allows for more sophisticated weapons and recruitment, and the cycle continues with international complicity through mineral supply chains that rarely check the origin of Nigerian resources. This creates what security scholars refer to as ungoverned spaces, areas where criminal networks function with impunity and the authority of the Nigerian state is either absent or challenged, leaving millions of citizens exposed to systematic exploitation and violence.

 

The Anatomy of Resource-Driven Terrorism

State and Non-State Actors: A Complex Web

Multiple actors operating at all levels comprise a complex ecosystem of domestic terrorism in Nigeria. At the top are international criminal enterprises and local affiliates that oversee large-scale mineral extraction operations. These collectives are connected to corrupt government agents, traditional rulers, and security officers who enable and legitimize their existence.

At the operational level, each of these armed groups has developed beyond the initial ideological basis for its formation. Boko Haram and the splinter faction Islamic State West Africa Province ISWAP have increasingly targeted the mineral-rich territory in the northeast. ISIS-WA and BH facilitated hundreds of attacks across Nigeria, ranging from small arms fire, use of seized military equipment, IED ambushes, and kidnappings. Likewise, in the Middle Belt and Northwest, armed groups have morphed from cattle rustlers and ethnic militias into sophisticated mining cartels.

Community defense forces, local militia or vigilante groups often start as community defense organizations and slowly transform into resource extraction businesses. These groups use pretexts of ethnic and religious divisions to justify their presence, while covertly collaborating with forces outside the country to ensure the mining sites remain under their control. These groups use the guise of addressing ethnic and religious tensions as a pretext for their presence and often collude with outside actors to take control of mining sites more clandestinely. There is a related problem in the Southeast with the Biafra secessionist movement, where control over territory rich in palm oil, coal, and other resources is hidden behind secessionist ideology.

State actors are perhaps the most worrisome. There are reports of protection from illegal mining by state officials, military, and police personnel in various ranks. The forms of this protection can vary from early notice of security operations to being directly involved in the resource extraction itself. The bombings of mining sites by the Nigerian military seem to be aimed more often at resistance oriented towards communities instead of terrorist groups, indicating bureaucratic complicity in the control of resources.

 

The Economics of Terror

There are enormous financial motivations for domestic terrorism in Nigeria. It is estimated conservatively that illegal mines bring in $3 billion each year, a large amount of which is used to fund terrorism. For example, the gold mining alone in Zamfara and Kebbi states is said to bring in hundreds of millions of dollars a month for armed groups, which fund these increasingly sophisticated weapons and fighters.

The economics are twofold. In the end, armed groups employ violence to remove populations from resource-rich areas, giving them unimpeded access to mining sites. At the transportation stage, these groups monopolize supply chains through checkpoint taxation and convoy protection services. At the market level, they export minerals informally, maintaining connections with buyers who export these minerals often in international markets.

This economic model creates very strong incentives for a continued cycle of violence. In contrast to ideologically driven terrorism, resource-driven terrorism has a steady stream of income to fund the growth and increasing sophistication of its operations. Control over more territory meant access to more resources. The greater the violence used, the more successful the population displacement. The greater the displacement, the lower the resistance to extraction activities.

 

Case Studies: Five States Under Siege

Case Study 1: Benue State - The Epicenter of Resource Terrorism

The phenomenon of domestic terrorism in Nigeria is most clearly linked to minerals in Benue State. While these are often framed as farmer/herder conflicts, the violence in Benue is directly connected to the presence of significant deposits of limestone, coal, lead, zinc, and rare earth minerals in the state. 

Timeline of Terror (2020-2025):

- 2020: 492 recorded deaths from "herder attacks"

- 2021: 687 deaths, coinciding with increased mining activity in Kwande and Logo LGAs

- 2022: 834 deaths, with attacks concentrated around limestone quarries

- 2023: 1,247 deaths, marked by the emergence of sophisticated armed groups

- 2024: 2,156 deaths, representing a 73% increase

- 2025 (Jan-May): 1,089 deaths, including the recent Yelewata massacre

Local authorities say at least 100 people are dead in a town in northcentral Nigeria where gunmen attacked overnight, leaving bodies burned beyond recognition next to charred mounds of produce and farm tools. As the Yelewata attack clearly shows, within these types of attacks, entire communities are not only attacked but destroyed, making it impossible to resettle in.

- Resource Correlation Analysis: Of mapped attacks, 87% are within 10 kilometers of known mineral deposits. The heaviest levels of violence occur in tandem with moments of international commodity price increases for goods such as limestone and rare earth minerals. Peaks in community displacement correlate with the granting of corporate mining licenses in 2023-2024, indicating a synchronization between legal and illegal modalities of extraction and the tactics employed to secure them.

- Inadequate Government Response: Over 500,000 IDPs in Benue, and the governmental response is still reactive and inadequate. While in May, 42 people died in a rampage of attacks across Benue state, and 56 were reportedly killed around Easter in April, there seems to be no substantive attempt at justice. Military operations are reactive, looking to pursue the attackers after an incident, rather than proactively through intelligence-led operations to prevent attacks.

 

Case Study 2: Plateau State - The Tin Mining Terrorism Complex

The years of crisis in Plateau State have revolved around the struggle for control over the deposits of tin, columbite and tantalite, which have made Jos, one of the mining centers in Africa. Over 3000 deaths have been attributed to the state since 2020, and the attacks are routine, around mining concessions.

Timeline and Resource Nexus:

847 deaths between 2020-2021, the majority of which occurred in Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Jos South LGAs, which are all known mining areas.

- 2022: A rise in violence as new tantalite deposits were discovered, leading to 1,156 deaths.

- 2023: 1,234 kills, attacks began to cover newly set up mining camps

- 2024: 1,089 deaths, a slight decrease as a result of consolidated territory control

- 2025: 234 deaths (Jan-May) further the establishment of control over strategic mining zones

Plateau violence is a clear demonstration of how terrorism transitions from a displacement tool to a territorial control mechanism of choice. The space created violently between 2020-2021 is now being occupied by large-scale mining protected by the same armed actors that displaced the populations.

Case Study 3: Zamfara State - Gold Rush Terrorism

While gold deposits in Zamfara have drawn international attention, local communities have borne the brunt in the form of systematic terrorism. It has recorded the highest number of bandit-related fatalities in Nigeria, with more than 2,500 individuals said to have been killed since 2020.

- The Gold Connection: Zamfara produces an estimated 200 kilograms of gold monthly, generating approximately $12 million in revenue. Armed groups control 70% of mining sites, using terrorism to maintain territorial control. The correlation between gold prices and violence is stark; every $100 increase in international gold prices corresponds with a 15% increase in attacks.

- Government Complicity Indicators: The federal government's 2019 mining suspension in Zamfara was lifted in 2021 despite continued violence, suggesting prioritization of revenue over security. Military operations target community resistance more frequently than bandit camps, indicating an institutional bias toward mining interests.

 

Case Study 4: Katsina State - The Border Mining Terrorism Network

Katsina's proximity to the Niger border thus becomes key in smuggling networks for minerals. Since 2020, the state has seen more than 1,800 fatalities, with violence proliferating in areas of deposits for iron ore, gypsum, and clay.

Cross-Border Dimensions: Terrorist groups operate across the Nigeria-Niger border, exploiting jurisdictional gaps to maintain mining operations. Weapons flow from Libya through Niger into Katsina's mining areas, creating a militarized extraction economy that generates an estimated $5 million monthly.

 

Case Study 5: Kaduna State - Railway Terrorism and Mineral Transport

Kaduna's rail network linking Abuja and Kaduna is an ideal transport avenue for minerals. Strikes against the railway system are directly related to disrupting government-controlled mineral exports and having to rely on terrorist routes.

Infrastructure Terrorism: The March 2022 train attack that killed 8 and kidnapped 62 passengers occurred near major limestone and granite quarries. Subsequent attacks have systematically targeted transportation infrastructure that could compete with terrorist-controlled mineral supply chains.

 

Government Complicity and Institutional Failure

Systemic Inadequacies

The Nigerian state's response to domestic terror exposes state institutional failures that tread the line between complicity. Security forces are consistently present after attacks, rarely if ever prevent them and rarely arrest the attacker. Such a pattern would mean either huge intelligence failures or wilful negligence.

- Intelligence Failures or Complicity: Nigeria's intelligence architecture includes the Department of State Services (DSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and military intelligence. Despite this apparatus, terrorist attacks occur with predictable timing and locations, particularly around mining sites during peak extraction seasons. The failure to act on obvious patterns suggests an institutional compromise.

- Military Response Patterns: Rather than bases of the terrorists, Nigerian military campaigns are often waged against displaced communities. Airstrikes were often conducted on villages that were rumored to have terrorists, rather than actual camps with confirmed terrorists. This trend protects the operations of terrorists while also seeming to address security concerns.

- Collapse of the Judicial System: Fewer than 5% of prosecutions for terrorist-related charges lead to a conviction. The majority of arrested suspects are never tried, leading to a culture of impunity which encourages continued violence. This vacuum of a failed judiciary creates space for the recruitment and activity of terrorist operations.

 

Political Economy of Inaction 

The existing system also has a place for Nigeria's political elite. Miner's licenses are a highly lucrative source of revenue for government officials, and terrorist occupation curbs competition with existing mining interests. The forced displacement of rural peoples also dampens likely political dissent to mega extraction projects. 

Revenue Sharing Arrangements: Evidence suggests informal revenue-sharing agreements between government officials and terrorist groups. These arrangements explain the persistence of violence despite significant military expenditure and international assistance.

 

The International Dimension

Global Supply Chain Complicity

The transition of Nigerian minerals mined under the control of terrorists into the global market happens via convoluted supply chains. Other minerals, such as gold, tin and tantalite, are fed into global manufacturing and fund the terror even further. The violence continues because international buyers do not require proof of where the minerals come from.

 

Inadequate International Response

Counter-terrorism aid from abroad doesn't usually focus on the economic drivers of violence, but rather on capacity building and equipment. This bolsters the state security apparatus, absent addressing the fundamental resource conflicts that fuel terrorism.

 

Conclusion

Unless the economic root causes of Nigeria's terrorism crisis are recognized by the international community and the Nigerian government, the problem will continue to remain. This means a complete overhaul of the governance of mineral extraction, accessible revenue sharing, and accountability of state actors perpetrating and allowing the terrorists to thrive.

The human toll of thousands of deaths each year, millions uprooted, and communities devastated is one that must compel action. But it needs to act on the causes, not the symptoms. The potential for Nigeria to find peace and stability for its citizens lies in tackling the resource side of Nigeria's terrorism problem.

For Nigeria, the decision is stark: either continue to privilege mineral extraction over human security or pursue holistic reforms that enable the populations living in resource-rich regions to benefit from that wealth instead of underpinning the very destruction of their lives. Ultimately, the international community must choose whether or not to be complicit in the trade of Nigerian lives for access to minerals, or whether to support the systemic restructuring which allows terrorism to have economic roots.

In the absence of these sorts of changes, terrorism in Nigeria will remain a vicious cycle that will take thousands more lives and continue to benefit the war profiteers who lack a conscience. It is too late for cosmetic changes; only deep-rooted fundamental changes would be able to break the cycle of resource-based terrorism that has occurred in Nigeria for decades.